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ABSTRACT
One way of carving up the broad ‘AI ethics and society’ research
space that has emerged in recent years is to distinguish between
‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’ research. While such ways of breaking
down the research space can be useful, we put forward several
concerns about the near/long-term distinction gaining too much
prominence in how research questions and priorities are framed.
We highlight some ambiguities and inconsistencies in how the dis-
tinction is used, and argue that while there are differing priorities
within this broad research community, these differences are not
well-captured by the near/long-term distinction. We unpack the
near/long-term distinction into four different dimensions, and pro-
pose some ways that researchers can communicate more clearly
about their work and priorities using these dimensions. We suggest
that moving towards a more nuanced conversation about research
priorities can help establish new opportunities for collaboration, aid
the development of more consistent and coherent research agendas,
and enable identification of previously neglected research areas.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a growing community of researchers focused on ensuring
that advances in AI are safe and beneficial for humanity (which we
call the AI ethics and society community, or AI E&S for short.) The
AI E&S research space is very broad, encompassing many different
questions: from how AI is likely to impact society in practice to
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what ethical issues that might raise, and what technical and gover-
nance solutions might be needed. These questions are approached
from many different perspectives and disciplines: philosophy, com-
puter science, political science, sociology, law, economics, and in-
ternational relations to name just a few. This research space is fast
growing, with new initiatives, workshops, and research centres
emerging every year.
Finding ways to break down this broad and evolving research
space is important, as it helps researchers to clearly formulate and
communicate problems and research agendas, collaborate effec-
tively with others, and to identify gaps in current research. Natural
ways to break down the AI E&S research space include by themes
or sectors (such as the impact of AI on medicine, the military, or
issues of social justice) or in relation to pre-existing disciplines
(distinguishing research on ethics from technical approaches from
governance and policy, for example).
Due to the cross-cutting nature of AI’s impacts, and the need for
deep interdisciplinary collaboration in this space, it may be useful
to have ways of carving up the research space that relate to more
fundamental priorities and assumptions rather than being tied to
specific domains or disciplines. One such way of carving up the
research space which has emerged in recent years is to distinguish
between those who focus on ‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’ issues
[7, 9, 22, 27].
However, the distinction between ‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’
is being over-emphasised as a way of characterising differences in
the research space. On closer inspection, the distinction is poorly
defined, and is used differently across people and contexts: some-
times to refer to issues on different timescales; sometimes to issues
related to different types of AI capabilities, and other times masks
deeper normative and empirical disagreements. Highlighting incon-
sistencies in how the near/long-term distinction is used, we argue
that it fails to adequately capture the complexity and nuance of
different approaches and priorities in the AI E&S research space,
and risks causing confusion and fuelling conflict.
By unpacking the distinction between near- and long-term into
four different dimensions, we propose some ways to more clearly
conceptualise different priorities and disagreements within the AI
E&S research space. First, we distinguish between research which
focuses on near/long-term capabilities as opposed to near/long-term
impacts, and argue that in both cases near/long-term is a spectrum
rather than a binary distinction. We show how this way of thinking
about different approaches could both improve collaboration and
communication between researchers as well as helping to identify
important areas of research which are currently neglected. Second,
we analyse some of the beliefs and disagreements which seem to
underpin differing research priorities, and suggest that clarifying
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these beliefs could aid mutual understanding between different
researchers and groups.
2 THE NEAR/LONG-TERM DISTINCTION IN
PRACTICE
The distinction between near- and long-term in AI E&S is used
both to distinguish different types of issues one might be concerned
about, as well as to highlight a divide or disagreement between two
research communities. In this section, we briefly review how the
distinction is made in the literature.
2.1 ‘Near-term’ issues
As the phrase ‘near-term’ suggests, those who have written about
the distinction tend to characterise near-term issues as those issues
that society is already facing or likely to face very soon: Brundage
[7] defines near-term issues as those society is “grappling with to-
day” and Cave and ÓhÉigeartaigh [9] talk in terms of “immediate or
imminent challenges” (p.5). Examples include concerns about data
privacy [32, 34], algorithmic bias [19, 21], self-driving car accidents
[4, 17], and ethical issues associated with autonomous weapons
[1, 2]. It is worth noting two things about these examples. First,
they tend to be relatively concrete and specific, and an important
feature of ‘near-term’ issues is the fact that they are already fairly
well-understood. Second, these examples tend to be directly related
to recent progress in machine learning which have enabled increas-
ing real-world applications of narrow and specialised AI systems:
for example in medical diagnosis and predictive policing [8, 28].
2.2 ‘Long-term’ issues
‘Long-term’ issues are often characterised as those arising from
advanced AI systems, or simply as issues that will arise far into the
future. Brundage [7] defines long-term issues as those that “either
only arise at all or arise to a much greater extent when AI is much
more advanced than it is today”, while Cave and ÓhH´igeartaigh
[9] point to “longer-term concerns and opportunities that are less
certain” (p.5). Examples of long-term issues often centre around
the implications of very advanced future AI with broad capabilities
(‘artificial general intelligence’, or AGI), which achieve human or
superhuman intelligence (‘human-level AI’ or ‘superintelligence’),
or are in some other way radically transformative [20]. For example,
the White House Report on Preparing for the Future of Artificial
Intelligence talks about “long-term concerns of AGI”, implicitly
equating the two [29]. While thinking about ‘long-term’ concerns
of AI may have begun with concerns about superintelligence and
related notions [5], the notion has since broadened to include chal-
lenges that are likely to have long-term consequences, as opposed
to merely arising far into the future. Examples include the effects
of advanced, ‘transformative AI’ on international security, race
dynamics and power relations [12, 18, 20].
2.3 The divide between ‘near-term’ and
‘long-term’ communities
Baum [3] not only distinguishes between near and long-term is-
sues, but also points to a divide between two different communities:
‘presentists’, who claim that “attention should go to existing and
near-term AI”, and ‘futurists’, who argue for focusing on “the po-
tential for radically transformative AI”. Cave and ÓhÉigeartaigh [9]
also point to “two seemingly separate communities of researchers
and technologists” focused on near and long-term issues.
Baum suggests these two groups disagree quite fundamentally
about what issues aremost important to work on. This has provoked
hostility between the two sides: the ‘near-term’ camp suggesting
that long-term concerns are overblown and a distraction from real
problems [11, 14], while some in the ‘long-term’ camp suggest
that the problems they focus on dwarf any near-term concerns in
importance [5, 31]. This adversarial dynamic seems to be at the
core of proposals to ‘reconcile’ or ‘bridge’ the two sides [3, 9].
3 THE PROBLEMWITH THE
NEAR/LONG-TERM DISTINCTION
‘Near-term’ and ‘long-term’ are often used in ways that combine
and conflate multiple different dimensions, including: when issues
arise; what kinds of technological capabilities issues relate to; how
well-understood or speculative issues are; how high-stakes issues
are and how many people they affect; and how long-lasting the
consequences of an issue are likely to be. As table 1 shows, even a
single definition or paper sometimes associates ‘near-term’ with
one of these dimensions and ‘long-term’ with another: Brundage
[7], for example, defines ‘near-term’ based on when issues arise
and ‘long-term’ in terms of technological capabilities.
Rather than describing a single dimension, we suggest that the
distinction between near- and long-term as currently used is better
understood as describing clusters of issues, incorporating multiple
dimensions:
Issues considered ‘near-term’ tend to be those arising in
the present/near future as a result of current/foreseeable AI
systems and capabilities, on varying levels of scale/severity,
which mostly have immediate consequences for people and
society.
Issues considered ‘long-term’ tend to be those arising far
into the future as a result of large advances in AI capabil-
ities (with a particular focus on notions of transformative
AI or AGI), and those that are likely to pose risks that are
severe/large in scale with very long-term consequences.
We believe that carving up the AI E&S research space according
to these clusters is problematic in two key ways. First, important
and nuanced information gets lost if we give too much prominence
to only two clusters. Many beliefs, values and assumptions will
vary within each of these clusters. For example, among those who
believe we should prioritise risks from advanced AI systems, there
seems to be substantial disagreement about why exactly those risks
are most important to work on, and what work should be done
today to prevent those risks [24, 30]. Similarly, there are many
different reasons a group may choose to focus on issues arising
from current applications of AI in society: because they believe we
should prioritise helping people alive today, because they believe
advanced AI systems are very far off or hard to predict, or because
they believe today’s problems are as high-stakes as anything we
might face in the future. As wewill discuss later, a binary distinction
may have led the research community to neglect impacts which
fall somewhere between ‘immediate’ and ‘very long-term’ [27].
Second, giving too much prominence to the ‘near-term’ and
‘long-term’ clusters without examining underlying beliefs can lead
researchers who identify with either side to end up misunderstand-
ing each other. For example, Etzioni [14] argues against the idea
that superhuman AI could pose an existential threat to humanity
(most prominently argued by Bostrom, [5]) by drawing on survey
data to suggest that experts do not believe superhuman AI systems
will arrive any time soon. But as Dafoe and Russell [13] point out
in response, Bostrom’s argument does not actually rely on any
assumptions about superintelligence being imminent. In practice,
Etzioni and Bostrom’s disagreement turns more on how important
and tractable they think it is to work on the potential risks from su-
perhuman AI today. The idea that there are two ‘camps’ of AI E&S
researchers, with very opposing perspectives, may lead researchers
like Etzioni and Bostrom to make unfounded assumptions about
the others’ perspective, and prevent them from engaging in more
substantive and productive debate.
At its core, the distinction between near and long-term in AI
E&S aims to capture the idea that different researchers and groups
will sometimes have quite different priorities which guide what
they work on, underpinned by some quite fundamental disagree-
ments. We believe that acknowledging these differences is useful,
but suggest that we need a clearer way to think and communicate
about what they are. In the following section, we propose exactly
that - some clearer ways to communicate about different research
priorities and underlying disagreements.
4 A CLEARER ACCOUNT OF RESEARCH
PRIORITIES AND DISAGREEMENTS
4.1 Unpacking the near/long-term distinction
As commonly used, the terms ‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’ in fact
appear to capture four different dimensions of differing priorities
within the AI E&S research community:
Capabilities: whether to focus on the impacts and chal-
lenges of current AI systems, or those relating to much more
advanced AI systems
Impacts: whether to focus mostly on the immediate impacts
of AI for society, or whether to consider possible impacts
much further into the future.
Certainty: whether to focus on impacts and issues that
are relatively certain and well-understood, or those that are
more uncertain and speculative.
Extremity: whether to focus on impacts at all scales, or to
prioritise focusing on those that may be particularly large
in scale.
None of these four dimensions are binary: one can choose re-
search questions that focus on AI systems that are more or less
advanced, exploring impacts on varying time horizons, with vary-
ing degrees of certainty and extremity. Table 1 shows how these
four dimensions in definitions of ‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’ by
different authors.
Of course, these dimensions are not entirely independent of one
another: for example, if one wants to focus on particularly large-
scale impacts of AI, one may have to be willing to consider more
speculative questions. However, it is still useful to unpack these
different dimensions, particularly because there are many possible
views and research questions which are not easily captured by the
near/long-term distinction as commonly used.
Looking at these four dimensions, we can identify some differ-
ences in what they refer to. ‘Capabilities’ and ‘impacts’ both refer
in some sense to time horizons; to whether research focuses on the
present (either in terms of AI capabilities or impacts) or whether it
looks further into the future. Both these dimensions therefore seem
to capture different interpretations of what it might mean to say
an issue is ‘near-term’ or ‘long-term’. ‘Certainty’ and ‘extremity’,
by contrast, do not relate so explicitly to time horizons: instead
they relate to the nature of impacts that different researchers might
focus on, and our ability to predict and understand these impacts.
Although these dimensions do appear in how near and long-term
are described, we suggest that they better characterised as captur-
ing the kinds of motivations researchers may have for choosing to
work on different areas.
4.2 Distinguishing capabilities and impacts
‘Near-term’ and ‘long-term’ are often modifiers applied to the state
of technological capabilities themselves, with near-term issues be-
ing those arising from the AI systems we have today [27], and
long-term issues being those we might expect to arise from certain
kinds of much more advanced AI systems [7]. At other times, ‘near-
term’ and ‘long-term’ refer rather to the impacts of the technology:
with near-term issues being the impacts of AI that society already
faces or will face in the immediate future [7], and long-term issues
being the impacts of AI that society might face very far into the
future [9].
Of course the timescale of technological advances and their im-
pacts on society will be related. However, conflating long-term
capabilities and impacts may mean the research community neglect
important questions about the potential long-term impacts of cur-
rent AI systems and their applications in society. For example, in
what ways could injustices perpetuated by increased use of current
algorithmic systems have very long-lasting and irreversible conse-
quences for inequality in society?What are the possible longer-term
implications of how data-intensive AI applications are beginning
to change norms around privacy and personal data? [23]
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that both capabilities
and impacts lie on a spectrum between near- and long-term. Under-
standing the potential ‘medium-term’ impacts of AI on society - for
example, exploring what different sectors and domains might look
like in 5-10 years as a result of current trends in AI development and
deployment - is likely to be important both for thinking about what
we can do today to protect against future harms, and for preparing
for longer-term impacts and scenarios. Similarly, there are many
ways in which AI systems could become more advanced over the
coming years, before reaching anything close to ‘superintelligence’
or ‘AGI’. We need to consider what issues these intermediate ad-
vances might raise, and what kinds of intermediate advances in
capabilities are mostly likely to be of harm or benefit for society.
Figure 1 shows how considering these two dimensions of capa-
bilities and impacts, each sitting on a spectrum, allows for more
nuanced categorisation of different types of issues.
Dimension ’Near-term’ ’Long-term’
AI Capabilities
“Attention should go to existing and near-term AI” [3,
p.2]
“Issues that either only arise at all or arise to a much
greater extent when AI is much more advanced than
it is today, and in particular if advances turn out to be
rapid.” [7]
“Attention should go to the potential for radically
transformative long-term AI” [3, p.2]
Impacts
“Issues society is grappling with today.” [7]
“Extant or imminently anticipated AI applications that
interact with existing legal, political, or social
concerns” [27, p.5]
“ [...] problem X that we are facing today with AI” [22]
“Longer-term concerns and opportunities that are less
certain” [9, p.5]
Certainty “Immediate challenges involving fairly clear players
and parameters” [9, p.5]
“Longer-term concerns and opportunities that are less
certain” [9, p.5]
Extremity “The existential risks of extreme AI advances” [27,
p.5]
Table 1: Dimensions underlying the ’near-term’ and ’long-term’ distinction in the literature.
This way of conceptualising the research space could also be
used to situate different research groups or research agendas. For
example, AI Now’s research seems to sit pretty squarely in the
bottom left-hand corner [33]; the Centre for the Governance of AI at
Oxford focuses mostly on issues at the top of the plot but spanning
left to right [12]; and the Centre for the Future of Intelligence at
Cambridge works on issues across a much wider range of the plot.
Both authors of this paper see their research as mostly focusing in
the upper-left quadrant - i.e. considering the medium-to-long-term
impacts of near-to-medium-term AI capabilities, primarily because
these issues have thus far been more neglected in discourse and
research around AI E&S impacts [27].
Of course, this still contains considerable ambiguity and room
for disagreement, and placing different issues on these axes requires
making assumptions about questions we don’t necessarily have
good answers to. Is there really good reason to think that advanced
AI systems will pose an existential threat to humanity, or that
advances in AI capabilities might pose a threat to democracy with
long-lasting consequences? We believe that provoking productive
debate and discussion on questions like these could in fact be a
valuable consequence of this way of conceptualising the research
space. However, we also recognise that any two-dimensional plot
is limited in its ability to capture more fundamental reasons why
people have those different priorities. We therefore next turn to
a discussion of some of the beliefs and motivations underpinning
different approaches in the AI E&S research space.
4.3 Underlying beliefs and motivations
One question that has not been explored in existing discussions
of the near/long-term distinction is why different researchers and
groups have different priorities. The idea of focusing on impacts
that are more or less certain and more or less extreme are present
in some definitions of near and long-term (see table 1); we suggest
that these dimensions may be best understood as capturing some
of the underlying motivations people have for focusing on certain
types of research questions.
One reason to focus on researching the longer-term impacts of
AI, and/or the impacts of more advanced capabilities, is that those
impacts might be more extreme and so particularly important to
manage. Indeed, groups like the Open Philanthropy Project who
explicitly prioritise risks from advanced AI state that “all else equal,
we’re more interested in artificial developments that would affect
more people and more deeply” [20]. Similarly, a research agenda
published by the Future of Humanity Institute in Oxford, typically
thought of as an institution with a ‘long-term’ focus, explicitly
highlights its “focus on extreme risks” [12].
The idea that immediate impacts of AI and/or those relating to
current AI systems are more certain and well-understood is also
sometimes invoked as a reason to work on those issues (or as an
argument against focusing on advanced capabilities and long-term
impacts.) For example, Andrew Ng explains that the reason he is
not concerned about advanced AI is “the same reason I don’t worry
about overpopulation on Mars... we’ve never set foot on the planet
so how can we productively worry about this problem now?” [16].
Relatedly, criticisms of those who focus on potential existential
risks from AI often make the argument that these worries are too
speculative, and are “a distraction from the very real problems with
artificial intelligence today” [10].
Working on problems that may have very extreme impacts on
humanity, and working on problems that are certain and well-
understood today are somewhat in tension with one another, and
this tension is perhaps a central driver of the divide between ‘long-
term’ and ‘near-term’ communities in AI E&S. Of course, in line
with the main message of this paper, our view is that there is not a
simple binary choice between focusing on ‘extreme’ impacts of AI
and focusing on ‘certain’ impacts - both exist on a spectrum, and
Figure 1: Distinguishing issues based on capabilities and impacts.
there may be many ways for the AI E&S community to identify
areas for research which have relatively high-stakes implications
while also being grounded enough in current AI and societal trends
to make progress on.
Further dimensions of disagreement may help explain why the
AI E&S community has divided in certain ways. Disagreement on
normative issues may be relevant here, such as around whether we
have a special moral obligation to help those who are alive today
over those who will live in future [26], or to prioritise helping those
worst off in society [25]. Someone who holds the more fundamental
philosophical belief that we should prioritise helping theworst off in
society, for example, is likely to choose to work on the implications
of AI for global fairness or social justice, regardless of their position
on the certainty/extremity tension as outlined above.
Other disagreements underpinning different priorities may be
empirical: disagreements about the nature of problems, or our abil-
ity to solve them. Whether one believes it is more important to
focus on challenges relating to current or advanced AI systems is
likely to depend at least in part on beliefs about AI progress. If you
believe we are likely to see very fast and/or discontinuous progress
in AI capabilities over the next few years, preparing for the poten-
tial impacts of these advances seems much more urgent than if you
believe progress will be slow and gradual, giving us time to solve
today’s problems before we have to deal with anything more ad-
vanced. Indeed, much of the disagreement about whether we should
be concerned about advanced AI seems to turn on disagreement
about whether large advances in AI capabilities are possible any
time soon [6, 15]. Which specific impacts one chooses to focus on
may also depend on empirical beliefs about the severity of different
issues: how damaging to society threats to privacy might be in the
long-term, and/or how likely advanced AI systems are to pose an
existential threat, for example.
Beliefs about our ability to forecast and/or influence the future
are also relevant - often scepticism about research on advanced
AI systems seems to stem from doubts about our ability to pro-
ductively work on these problems. Andrew Ng’s statement quoted
earlier [16] appears to express this kind of scepticism: that we can’t
‘productively’ work on the impacts of advanced AI systems.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The field of research concerned with the impact of AI on society
and humanity is fast growing. Due to the cross-cutting and inter-
disciplinary nature of these issues, it is useful to be able to carve up
the research space in ways that go beyond traditional disciplinary
or thematic boundaries in academia, and capture different underly-
ing assumptions about what the most important problems in this
space are. We propose more nuanced ways to do this that better
capture this rich and complex research space, breaking down the
binary distinction between ‘near-term’ and ‘long-term’ into four
different dimensions: capabilities, impacts, certainty and extremity,
and emphasising that all of these sit on a spectrum.
Based on this analysis, we have a few concrete recommenda-
tions for how the AI E&S research community can encourage more
nuanced and productive discussion about different priorities and
assumptions:
• Be specific about what you mean when using ‘near-
term’ or ‘long-term’ to refer to research priorities or projects.
As outlined in the previous section, we think it would be
particularly useful if there was a clearer distinction between
(a) immediate vs. long-term impacts on society, and (b) cur-
rent vs. much more advanced AI capabilities, and if there
were greater acknowledgement that in both cases ‘near to
long-term’ is a spectrum, not a binary distinction.
• Communicate clearly and explicitly about the assump-
tions and beliefs underlying your projects and priori-
ties, especially around some of the questions highlighted
above. A good example of this is the preface to Dafoe’s [12]
research agenda, which explicitly states its focus on extreme
risks from advanced AI (though they could go even further to
explain the reasoning behind this decision.) Another good ex-
ample is Parson et al. [27] who clearly state that their project
focuses on the “intermediate scale of AI impacts, time hori-
zons, and implications” since this is where their expertise is
most relevant, and where areas of potential importance are
receiving relatively less attention.
• Make an effort to understand the underlying motiva-
tions and assumptions of otherswith different research
priorities, again using some of the questions outlined in the
previous section as a starting point. Conferences, workshops
and journals could potentially help support this by providing
fora for researchers to debate such fundamental questions
and disagreements, improving mutual understanding.
By taking these steps, we hope the AI E&S research community
can: (a) establish new opportunities for collaboration and reduce
adversarial dynamics, while allowing for differences of opinion
and approach; (b) develop more consistent and coherent research
agendas by helping researchers to think more clearly about what
they prioritise; and (c) identify neglected research areas which may
have been overlooked due to not fitting neatly into existing ways
of characterising the research space.
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